Friedrich Hayek\u27s Terra Incognita of the Self by Dempsey, Gary Thomas
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1994 
Friedrich Hayek's Terra Incognita of the Self 
Gary Thomas Dempsey 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dempsey, Gary Thomas, "Friedrich Hayek's Terra Incognita of the Self" (1994). Dissertations, Theses, and 
Masters Projects. Paper 1539625909. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-0e33-6w26 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
FRIEDRICH HAYEK'S TERRA INCOGNITA OF THE SELF
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Government 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Gary Thomas Dempsey 
1994
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Gary Thomas Dempsey
Approved, December 1994
—
J a m e a ^ M .Miclot, Ph.D.
f Joel D . Schwartz, Ph
David Dessler, Ph.D
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT S
I wish to extend my fullest thanks to Professor James 
Miclot for his patience and thoughtful direction. I also wish to 
thank Professors Joel Schwartz and David Dessler for their 
insight and suggestions. My thanks cannot end here: I also wish
to thank Kelly O'Donnell for her support and encouragement, my 
fellow graduate students and indeed the entire Department of 
Government.
ABSTRACT
The subject of the following study is Friedrich Hayek's 
belief that there is a terra incognita of the self; that human beings 
are incapable of becoming thoroughly self-aware of their own 
cognitive processes. My thesis is that Hayek affirms Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s claim that "we are unknown to ourselves," and that he 
does so improving on Nietzsche’s connectionist theory of mind. I 
then go on to demonstrate how this improved theory of mind 
informs both Hayek's political and economic theories.
FRIEDRICH HAYEK'S TERRA INCOGNITA OF THE SELF
Shortly before his death in 1984 "the greatest of 
Nietzsche's modern disciples,"1 Michel Foucault, began assigning 
his students the works of Friedrich Hayek. According to his 
American biographer, Foucault
advised his students... to read with special care the 
collected works of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich 
Hayek— distinguished Austrian economists, strident 
yet prescient critics of Marxism, apostles of a 
libertarian strand of modern social thought rooted in 
a defense of the free-market as a citadel of 
individual liberty and a bulwark against the power of 
the state.2
But why should Foucault's philosophical reflections veer off in 
this surprising direction if his Nietzschean views and the views 
of Hayek are normally associated with opposite ends of the 
political spectrum?: Hayek's with the libertarian right and 
Nietzsche's with the post-modern left. Why should Foucault assign 
Hayek if "Hayek's work is in the tradition of classical 
liberalism"3 while Nietzsche is "best known...as an opponent of 
political liberalism?"4 Perhaps Foucault recognized something
1 Edward W. Said, "Michael Foucault, 1926-1985," After 
Foucaulb:„ Humanistic Knowledge. Postmodern Challenges ed. 
Jonathan Arac (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 1.
2 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1993), 310.
3 John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 1.
4 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,. 
Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974), 412.
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3others overlooked. Perhaps he recognized a philosophical parallel 
between these disparate thinkers.
In the following pages I attempt to demonstrate that there 
is just such a parallel between Hayek and Nietzsche. I contend 
that both thinkers maintain that "we are unknown to ourselves;"5 
that there is a terra incognita of the self. The focal point of this 
paper, however, is that Nietzsche leaves us stranded. He does not 
explain adequately why we are inhibited from knowing ourselves. 
My thesis is that Hayek rescues us from where Nietzsche leaves us 
marooned, and that he does so by improving on Nietzsche's theory 
of mind. Indeed, I argue that Hayek surpasses Nietzsche insofar 
as he offers us a more detailed explanation as to why a portion 
of the mind must remain unknown to the conscious self. The paper 
is organized into three sections: In the first section I will
review the parallels between Hayek and Nietzsche's theories of 
mind. In the second section I will demonstrate how Hayek improves 
Nietzsche's theory. In the third and final section I will focus 
on how Hayek's improvement informs both his political and
economic theories.
I . A REVIEW OF THE PARALLELS BETWEEN 
HAYEK AND NIETZSCHE ' S THEORIES OF MIND
Hayek's theory of mind is not located in a single text.
Rather, it is contained in the corpus of his writings.
Nevertheless, Hayek's first and most substantial foray into the 
subject of mind occurred when he began writing The Sensory Order in
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals trans. 
Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 
1967), 17.
41921. Soon after embarking on the manuscript, however, Hayek's 
attention was drawn to issues of economic theory and he was 
unable to complete the project until 1948. The book's immediate 
goal was to criticize the positivist psychology of Ernst Mach 
which dominated the field of theories of mind from before 1918.
Mach was unsatisfied with the notion that there are two 
domains, a physical domain and a mental domain, between which 
interaction is impossible. Mach was one of the first in a long 
line of adversaries of such dualism. He maintained that the 
belief that there is a 'real' world that lurks behind the veil of 
what appears to our minds is mistaken. Mach rejected the view 
that there is another realm behind our sensory experiences. 
Instead, every object has sensory characteristics; colors, 
sounds, temperatures, odors, mass, etc. For Mach the physical 
world and the objects in it are nothing other than complexes of 
such sense data. A chair is nothing more than a collection of the 
sensory qualities of color, shape, feel, etc. In Mach's word's, 
"Bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations 
make up bodies."6
Groupings of sensations that regularly appear together or 
that "cohere strongly,"7 comprise what Mach calls items; items
6 Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1902); quoted in Robert P. deVries, "The Place of Hayek's
Theory of Mind and Perception in the History of Philosophy and 
Psychology," Havek, Co-ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in 
P_h_llosoohv^  __Eo 1 itics, Economics and the History of Ideas ed. Jack 
Birner and Rudy Van Zijp (London: Routledge, 1994), 316-317.
7 Ibid., 317.
5which we often identify with labels such as star, atom or chair. 
This position is called "neutral monism."8 "Monism" because 
sensory data are the only elements in the universe. "Neutral" 
because sensations are neither physical or mental. There is 
simply a one to one correspondence between the sensory qualities 
of the physical world and our sensations of these 
characteristics. Reality and our perception of it, argues Mach, 
are comprised of ontologically homogeneous elements.
Hayek's The Sensory Order takes its starting point with Mach’s 
universe of sensory characteristics. Like Mach, Hayek 
distinguishes between the singular and the plural: The singular 
consists of the sensory element itself; the plural consists of 
the grouping of sensory elements with each other. With this 
definition both Hayek and Mach recognize that observation is not 
limited to the digestion of singular sensory elements. Instead, 
it entails the event of an active grouping of sensory elements 
with each other.
Mach1s views regarding this grouping process, however, are 
not fully worked out. According to Hayek, Mach does not 
appreciate the implications of the grouping process that oversees 
our conscious observations. Whereas Mach maintains that every 
item we observe can be deconstructed into its component sensory 
characteristics, Hayek warns that Mach underestimates the ongoing
8 Robert P. deVries, "The Place of Hayek's Theory of Mind 
and Perception in the History of Philosophy and Psychology," 
Hayek. Co-ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in Philosophy. 
Politics. Economics and the History of Ideas ed. Jack Birner and 
Rudy Van Zijp (London: Routledge, 1994), 317.
process which supervises their ordering in the first place.
Indeed, Hayek points out that the process by which sensory
elements are ordered is embedded in the very observation of an 
item. Accordingly, Hayek claims that any conception of the world 
must take into account our taking of the world to be as we perceive.
In his critique of Mach's theory of mind it thus becomes
apparent that Hayek accords a central importance to the event of 
organizing sense data. Indeed, Hayek explains that in the chaos 
of innumerable sensory experiences, things do not have self- 
evident meaning. Things have "meaning only within a given order 
[of] relation[s];"9 relations which our mind imposes on the swirl 
of our sensory experiences. With this recognition Hayek begins 
his discussion or the complex construction of human 
understanding.
Comprehension, for Hayek, does not begin with the sensory 
event at hand. Comprehension, rather, is forged by the connection, 
the "linkage"10 of new sensory information, optical, acoustical 
and otherwise, to previous sensory experiences. That is to say, 
the mind operates by assembling new sensory data into 
associations with our accumulated inventory of knowledge or, more
9 Friedrich Hayek, The Sensory Order (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1952), 4-5.
10 Friedrich Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," The 
Essence of Hayek ed. Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt Leube (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1984), 229.
7precisely with our mnemonic archive.11 Hayek explains:
the apparatus by means of which we learn about the 
external world is itself the product of a kind of 
experience. It is shaped by the conditions prevailing 
in the environment in which we live, and it 
represents a kind of generic reproduction of the 
relations between the elements of this environment 
which we have experienced in the past.12
The result of this process is a network of "links" Hayek calls
the "sensory order,"13 an order which enables each individual to
navigate through storm of sensory information.
The process of comprehension thus does not begin with
particular sensations, but precedes them; it operates on previous
sensory events which organize them into a pattern which becomes
the basis for their mental significance. "We may express this
also," explains Hayek, "by stating that experience is not a
function of mind or consciousness, but that mind and
consciousness are rather products of experience."14 Since sensory
experience precedes understanding in this way, Hayek argues that
1:1 This connectionist model seems to have some basis in 
modern neuroscience. Neuroscientists maintain that neural 
connections are worn by experiences, especially recurrent or 
traumatic experiences. What results is a process called long term 
potentiation or LTP. The LTP process involves a change in the 
efficiency of synaptic transmissions along pathways that link 
neurons—in other words, electrochemical signals travel more 
easily along LTP pathways. According to this theory these 
electrochemical pathways connecting neurons possess a class of 
postsynaptic excitatory amino acid receptors known as NMDAs. NMDA
receptors are activated each time the brain is confronted by a 
sensory event. Over time the receptivity of neurons with worn 
NMDA is enhanced. The ability of the brain to comprehend sensory 
information is thus shaped by the historical paths seared into 
the neural network.
12 Hayek, Philosophical Consequences," 225.
13 ibid.
24 Ibid., 226.
meaning is not given but invented. The attributes of a given sensory event 
are not intrinsic qualities that are somehow "communicated"15 to 
the mind. Rather, to understand something is to relate it or
"link" it to things external and prior to it. Sense is brought to
things before they are comprehended. As such, what is 
comprehended is merely the by-product of the constructive 
activity of the human mind rather than an objective reality given 
to it by the world. Indeed, Hayek purposes that:
...the classification of events in the external world 
effected by our senses proves not to be a 'true' 
classification, i.e. not one which enables us 
adequately to describe the regularities in this 
world, and...the properties which our senses 
attribute to these events are not objective 
properties of these individual events, but merely 
attributes defining the classes which our senses assign 
them. . .16
Accordingly, says Hayek, "the fact that the world which we know 
seems wholly an orderly world" is not the result of a translucent 
logos, but "merely a result of the method by which we perceive
it."17 If logos were self-evident there would be no hesitation
regarding meaning; the order of our ideas would simply conform to 
the order of things, doubt would be eliminated and we would 
possess knowledge for all eternity. On the contrary, Hayek does 
not view knowledge as a ubiquitous logic but as an 
intelligibility arrived at through the domestication of our
ibid.
16 Hayek, The Sensory Order. 173. Emphasis added.
17 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 235. Emphasis
added.
9sensory experiences. Knowledge is only the aftermath of this ongoing 
process.
This emphasis on the notion that we construct our objects 
of knowledge by actively organizing or sense experiences 
distinguishes Hayek's theory of mind from that of John Locke. 
Indeed, for Hayek, we initiate knowledge by bringing meaning to our 
environment, but Locke holds an essentially causal theory of 
perception, one that states "that the way in which the senses 
furnish us with knowledge of nature is by the qualities of 
objects causing ideas in our minds."18 To put this distinction 
another way, the Lockean view of the relationship between subject 
and object can be represented by a receiving antenna into which 
external reality— albeit distorted— is intaken; whereas in 
Hayek's view of the subject and object relationship, the activity 
of knowing can be represented by a broadcast antenna which 
transmits an order onto the media of the world around us. In 
either case the initiation of knowledge flows from opposite 
sources; for Locke knowledge proceeds from the external, for 
Hayek knowledge proceeds from the internal.
Hayek's un-Lockean constructivism nevertheless points to a 
definitively Nietzschean theory of mind. Like Hayek, Friedrich 
Nietzsche contends that "No event exists in itself. Everything 
that happens consists of a group of phenomena that are gathered and
John Dunn, Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 78. Emphasis added.
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selected. . . "19 and knowledge is "nothing more than this: Something 
strange" which can be connected or "traced back to something 
known by the senses."20 Both thinkers thus recognize that 
comprehension is constructed. It consists of creating coherence 
through the use of associations so that the tempest of sensory 
events can be organized into various forms and patterns. 
Otherwise, as William James points out, if we were unable to 
order our sensory experiences, we would simply get each 
successive moment of experience as a sea-anemone on a reef 
receives whatever nourishment that washes by. But through 
ordering we harness our sensory experiences and drive them to our 
pragmatic ends.21
Since sense is something grafted onto the abyss of sensory 
experiences Nietzsche, like Hayek, argues that meaning is not 
self-evident, but something that is constructed, something that 
is brought to things before they are comprehended. As Nietzsche 
explains, "man finds in things nothing but what he himself has 
imported into them"22 and "There are no ' facts-in-themselves, ' for
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke. Grossoktavauscrabe. 2nd ed. 
ed. Kroner (Leipzig: Kroner, 1901-1913 and 1926), XII, § 2; 
quoted in Jean Granier, "Nietzsche's Conception of Chaos," The 
New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation ed. David B. 
Allison (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994). 135. Emphasis partially 
added.
20 Friedrich Nietzsche; quoted in A Nietzsche Reader trans. 
and ed. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1977), § 40.
21 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York, 
Longmans, 1940), 51.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §
60 6. Emphasis added.
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a sense must always be projected into them before they can be 
'facts."'23 The compatibility of Hayek's connectionist theory of 
mind with Nietzsche's, however, does not end here. Connectionism 
leads both thinkers to four common conclusions: that the mind is 
self-referential, that error is a condition of the mind, that the 
mind is in a perpetual state of becoming, and that a portion of 
the mind is hidden from the conscious self.
A. SELF-REFERENTIALISM 
As we have seen, Hayek contends that the mind is a weave of 
new and old sensory data in a network of connections or "links" 
called the "sensory order." This network, he maintains, involves 
past sensory information to which new sensory information is 
connected; i.e. sensory data has significance insofar as it shows 
a certain regularity in appearance to things we have experienced 
in the past. The implication of this process is that each sensory 
event is colored by experiences which are not a part of the 
particular "linkage" which is occurring, but shaped by what 
exists within the web of one's prior experiences. As a result of 
this process, understanding cannot be broken down in to component 
sensory events. Each sensory event's identity is defined not by 
itself as a discrete unit, but by its interrelations to other 
sensory events, events which are not occurring. They are "linked" 
with one another in such a way that they actually determine what 
each one is through their interconnections. Our sensory 
experiences are thus not singular in nature. Instead, each bit of
23 ibid., § 556. Emphasis added.
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sensory experience is intertwined with the numerous other bits of 
sensory information that comprise our personal history i.e. all 
sensation are embedded in a complex of relations to other 
sensations; there is only sensory information in intersubjective 
relations with other sensory information, there essence lies in 
their relation to the others and their interpenatration of the 
same. Ultimately, where one part ends and another begins is 
undecidable. The mind, concludes Hayek, "is a polycentric order, 
that is...its actions are determined by the relation and mutual 
adjustment to each other of the [multiple] elements of which it 
consists."24
As with all wholes that are subject to such
intersubjectivity, no sensory experience is insular or autonomous 
or, as Umberto Eco might put it, a sensory event becomes 
different when it is connected to another. "The connection
changes the perspective" so that "every detail of the world,
every voice, every word written or spoken has more than its 
literal meaning, it tells a s e c r e t ." 25 It "resonates” with what 
Jaques Derrida might call "traces" of something "other."26
Consequently, Hayek concludes that the "sensory order" will 
"remain forever in a realm of its own...we shall never be able
24 Friedrich Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. Politics and 
Economics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 73.
25 Umberto Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum trans. William Weaver 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1989), 378. Emphasis in 
original.
o c t
Jaques Derrida, Of Grammatoloqy trans. Gayatri Spivak 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), passim.
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fully to explain or to 'reduce' [it] to something else."27 We 
shall never be able to refer to sensory data in a purely self- 
contained or singular way, nor be able to describe sensory 
experiences in a complete manner.
Hayek's contention that sensory experiences are not 
discrete, but always inherently plural corresponds to Nietzsche's 
claim that our sensory experiences cannot be reduced to singular 
events. "If I remove," he writes, "all the relationships, all the 
properties...of a thing, the thing does not remain over,"28 once 
"one removes other 'things,' then a thing has no properties," no 
context and, therefore, no meaning.29 For Nietzsche then, there 
is no such thing as sensory data in itself. Rather, there is only 
sensory data in relations with other sensory data. The 
implication of this understanding is that sensory experiences 
cannot be analyzed irrespective of the other contents of the mind 
which contains them. Under this view, in order to describe a 
sensory experience all the way through you must describe its 
relations to other bits of information which in turn are related 
to further bits, and so on in an infinite regress. Logically, any 
attempted description of a sensory experience would thus have to 
take into consideration the complete order that arises from each 
person's previous sensory experiences.
27 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 251.
28 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 558.
29 Ibid., § 557.
14
Conceiving of the mind as a whole in this way implies that 
"what we know an any moment about the external world is 
determined by the order of the apparatus of classification which 
has been built up by pre [vious] sensory linkages."30 That is to 
say, "we interpret any new event in the environment in light 
of... experience."31 Since each person's experience is uniquely 
conditioned by what precedes it in their specific life, every 
sensory experience is not uniform, it is relative to one's 
experiential background. Our cognitive template or "sensory 
order," in other words, is biographical or, more figuratively, 
historically finger-printed. Under this view, question like "What 
is X?" has strict meaning only within relation to the perceiver's 
unique historical experience. This leads Hayek to the conclusion 
that each person's capacity for understanding is distinct from 
all others. Just as there are no two identical snowflakes, there 
are no two identical sensations of a snowflake. Instead, all 
knowing is historical and all histories are unique.
In underlining the historicity of knowledge, Hayek 
concludes that the world we perceive is only "an interpretation 
based on the experience of the individual"32 or similarly, "every 
sensation, even the 'purest, ' must. . .be regarded as an 
interpretation of an event in light of the past experience of the
28 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 227.
31 Ibid., 225.
32 Hayek, The Sensory Order, 42.
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individual."33 Indeed, Hayek poses a scenario in which an 
archaeologist discovers an item and cannot discern whether it is 
a manmade artifact or a product of nature that by chance appears 
to be an artifact. With respect to this scenario Hayek claims 
that:
There is no way of deciding this but by trying to 
understand the working of the mind of prehistoric 
man, of attempting to understand how he would have 
made such an implement...[but ultimately our 
archaeologist] interprets what he sees in terms of 
the workings of his own mind."34
Such self-referentialism conforms to a distinctively 
Nietzschean approach to knowledge. Like Nietzsche, Hayek claims 
that we understand everything in light of our previous sensory 
experiences. Indeed, we are like historians confronted with a 
collection of documents which must be interpreted. Although the 
documents may suggest some hypotheses, the data must be organized 
in order to arrive at a explanation of the past that has some 
coherence. There is, however, an intermediary sphere between 
historian and document, subject and object, a sphere occupied by 
our previous experiences. Understanding is thus mediated by the 
specific experiences of the historian/observer. As a result, 
reports Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche maintains that "All knowledge is 
an interpretation of being provided by a living and cognizing 
sub ject... Thus conceived truth is not something independent, 
unconditioned, and absolutely universal. Rather it is
33 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 22 6.
34 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: 
Studies in the Abuse of Reason (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 
197 9), 46. Emphasis added.
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inextricably involved with the being of the living subject and 
the world that he has constructed.1,35 In other words, says 
Nietzsche, "facts are precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations."36
Conversely, we cannot interpret what our experience does 
not provide us a "link" to. Indeed, according to Hayek, "We can 
only know such kinds of events as show a degree of regularity in 
their occurrence in relations with others"37 already in our mind 
or, as Nietzsche puts it, "nobody can get more out of 
things...for what one lacks access to experience one will have no 
ear."38 In short, a sensory event which has no relation to 
anything previously perceived can not be comprehended. We sit 
within our historical net, explains Nietzsche, "...and whatever 
we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which 
allows itself to be caught in precisely our net."39
Self-referentialism is thus a common theme to both authors. 
To be sure, Nietzsche admits that he has no right to claim to 
have understood his mentor: "I am far from believing that I have
35 Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the 
Understanding of His Philosophical Activity trans. Charles F. 
Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz (Tuscon: The University of 
Arizona Press, 1965), 184-185.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 481.
37 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 235.
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Vintage, 1967), 261.
39 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the 
Prejudices of Morality trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), § 117. Emphasis in original.
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truly understood Schopenhauer, rather it is only through 
Schopenhauer I have learned to understand myself a little better"40 
and elsewhere he comments, "I assume that everyone now 
understands how much these truths are only— my truths."41
Similarly, Hayek claims:
My gain from hearing or reading what other people 
thought was that it changed, as it were, the colors 
of my own concepts. What I heard or read did not 
enable me to reproduce their thought but altered my 
thought. I would not retain their ideas or concepts 
but modify the relations between my own.42
Furthermore, Hayek asserts that it is possible to "understand
only what is similar to our own mind, it necessarily follows that
we must be able to find all that we can understand in our own
mind."43 In other words, knowledge arises from a latent capacity
that exists antecedent to comprehension. A sensory experience unique
in all its aspects, therefore, will be utterly incomprehensible;
information is only intelligible when it can be associated with
that which is bekannt or already familiar to us. Consequently,
concludes Hayek, "much that we believe to know about the external
40 Friedrich Nietzsche, Gesammelte Werke, Musarionausqabe 
23 vols. (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1920-1929), § 7:140; quoted in 
Leslie Paul Thiel, Friedrich Nietzsche and The Politics of the 
Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 35. Emphasis added.
41 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil trans.
Marianne Cowen (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), § 231. 
Emphasis in original.
42 Friedrich Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, 
Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), 52-53. Emphasis added.
43 Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 
(London: Henley and Routledge, 1949), 68. Emphasis added.
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world is, in fact, knowledge about ourselves;" it is a disclosure 
of who one is historically.44
B. ERROR AS A CONDITION OF THE MIND 
Given the constructed nature of knowledge, Hayek maintains 
that there is no basis to believe that the representation of 
physical reality which it makes possible is an accurate 
representation of the world as it is. Each mind functions, he 
says, through a recognition of what is similar to that mind at 
the expense of what is particular to that item. "What we perceive
of the external world," says Hayek,
are never all the properties which a particular 
object can be said to possess objectively, not even 
only some of the properties which these objects in 
fact do possess physically, but always only certain 
'aspects,' relations to other kinds of objects which 
we assign to all elements of the classes in which we 
place the perceived objects. This may often 
compromise relations which objectively do not at all 
belong to the particular object but which we merely 
ascribe to it as a member of the class in which we 
place it as a result of some accidental collection of 
circumstances in the past.45
In other words, our observations are illusory. Our "sensory
order" is not a strict catalogue of empirical representations,
but an abstracted collection of similarities and connections, of
incomplete representations which do not capture the full detail
of things. As A.E Galeotti summarizes this point, "We do not know
tokens, but kinds."46 Nevertheless, our "sensory order" comprises
44 Hayek, The .Sensjary Order, 6.
45 Ibid., 143.
4*> A.E. Galotti, "Individualism, Social Rules, Tradition: 
The Case of Friedrich Hayek," Political Theory (May 1987), 170.
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the vary mechanism through which we interpret new experiences and 
are able to interact with our environment at all.
Since what we experience is abstracted, Hayek argues that 
we must "divest” ourselves "of the habitual assumption that all 
we have learned from experience must be true... knowledge based 
entirely on experience may be entirely false."47 Moreover, since 
knowledge must always refer to abstracted "elements which are 
defined by certain relations with other elements," knowledge is 
ultimately be based on the "assumption that these relations 
actually exist."48 In short, Hayek questions the authenticity of 
the image that our mind presents to us because only a selection 
of what we are observing is being ordered. Hence, he argues, our 
knowledge of the surrounding environment is duplicitous and we 
should not dogmatize it; hold all you positions open to 
criticism, he says, even this one.49
This skepticism reflects a Nietzschean approach to the 
subject of knowledge. Like Hayek, Nietzsche claims that "The 
entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and 
simplification"50 Our mind attempts "to subsume, to schematize, 
for the purpose of intelligibility"51 and "Everything of which we
4  ^Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 228.
48 Ibid., 232.
4  ^Gerard Radnitzky, "The Evolution of the Extended Order: 
Reflections on Hayek's Theory and its Political Implications," 
Organization and Change in Complex Systems ed. Marcelo Alonso 
(New York: Paragon House, 1990), 184.
50 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 503.
51 Ibid., § 515.
become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, 
interpreted through and through."52 This abstraction, he 
continues, results in a kind of deception, a lie, an error which 
does not contain the essences of things. As one commentator 
summarizes Nietzsche's view, all our knowledge is an "illusion" 
because our observations are incomplete, they do not penetrate 
into the essences of things.53 Our observations, in short, are 
falsehoods. As Nietzsche puts it, "That which we now call the world 
is the result of a host of errors and phantasies which have 
gradually accumulated."54 Knowledge is, moreover, only the 
"measuring of earlier and later errors by one another," of the 
mind's organization of inaccuracies.55 Consequently, Nietzsche 
remarks that the order which we find in the world allows us to 
pragmatically function it, but it "does not prove them. Life is 
no argument. The conditions of life... include error."56
Nietzsche and Hayek thus both agree that the mind is 
neither a passive receptacle nor an unblemished mirror for 
reality. Instead, our mind abstracts and falsifies our 
surroundings so that we can pragmatically function in the world.
52 Ibid., § 477.
53 Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding 
of His Philosophical Activity. 185.
54 Nietzsche; quoted in Jaspers. Nietzsche: An Introduction 
to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, 186.
55 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 520.
56 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), § 121.
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Indeed, Hayek argues that untruth or abstraction is a pre­
condition of pragmatic human activity. Similarly, Nietzsche 
argues that our incomplete "Truth is a kind of error without 
which a definite species of living being cannot live."57 Hayek 
and Nietzsche evidently recognize the primacy of practice over 
accuracy in the construction of human mind.
Since error is a condition of the mind, both thinkers are 
ultimately led to doubt that humans are capable of apprehending 
elementary or pure sensations from which we can form a foundation 
for human knowledge. Because everything we understand undergoes 
selection and ordering, the resulting map or model we form of the 
world is in no important respect grounded in the basis of sheer 
sense data, themselves incorruptible. Both thinkers, in short, 
stigmatize the Lockean view that our sensory experience "of 
natural objects correspond in some strong fashion to the way 
natural objects actually are."58 Rather, the picture we form of 
the world emerges straight from our interaction with the world, 
and it is always abstract in integrating things among the 
infinite aspects which it contains.
Since we cannot separate our means of perception, our mind, 
from that which is being perceived, we have no other way of 
observing the world, i.e. "we behold all things through the human
57 Nietzsche; quoted in Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction 
t£>__the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity. 18 6.
58 Dunn, Locke. 78.
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head and cannot cut off this head."59 There is no unmediated 
vantage point from which this knowledge can be gained, for such a 
vantage point implies a possibility not granted to us; the 
possibility of transporting ourselves outside of our existence so 
as to objectively behold it. Instead, participation in existence 
is our only window unto the world. We cannot escape from our 
cognitive template, our "sensory order's" lense, so as to attain 
a presuppositionless or unsituated perspective on the world as a 
whole in itself. Our mind's ordering principles "are the basis 
for all our judgments and 'knowledge'— there is absolutely no 
escape, no backway or bypath in to the real world."60 The vary means 
by which we observe the world intervenes in what we can observe 
and although we can reflect on aspects of our sense experiences, 
we must realize that reflection is always secondary and cannot 
stand independent to sense experience itself.
The belief that there is an objective viewpoint which gives 
an accurate account of the world, concludes Hayek, thus "must 
break down."61 No such world is accessible. Our view of the world 
is unavoidably mediated by the very means by which we view it or, 
as Nietzsche analogizes, humans are like creatures with their 
backs to reality and a mirror before them. No matter how close to 
the edge of the mirror they go their view of the whole of the
59 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book For 
Free Spirits trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), § 9.
Nietzsche, Daybreak, § 117. Emphasis in original.
61 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 233.
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reality behind them will always be mediated by their own eye. 
"Why does man not see things?" he asks, because "He is himself 
standing in the way."62
That we cannot achieve an unmediated view of the world 
leads Hayek to conclude that the historical aim of philosophy to 
develop a transcendental metaphysics must be abandoned. The 
objective of philosophy cannot be the formulation of a 
metaphysical system, but rather the investigation of the limits 
of human knowledge. Moreover, says Hayek, such an investigation 
must be reflexive since, in the end, all philosophical inquiry is 
immanent inquiry. Hayek is Nietzschean then in repudiating the 
belief that metaphysics can expose the essences or natures of 
things. Against Mach and other positivists Hayek rejects the 
belief that there is available to us "immaculate perception"63 or 
pure sensations which can contribute to an objective picture of 
the world. Instead, everything we observe is imbued with 
presuppositions. The notion that there are pristine sensations 
which "involve some direct communication of properties of the 
external objects, or...[which] constitute irreducible mental 
atoms or elements" is worthless because of the vary "lack of 
meaning of these hypotheses."64 Moreover, Hayek is emphatic that 
"the conception of an original pure core of sensations... is an
62 Nietzsche, Daybreak. § 438.
63 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For 
Everyone and No One trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 
1969), 144.
64 Hayek, The Sensory Order. 165.
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entirely unnecessary fiction."65 Our view of the world, rather, 
is mediated by our mind's ability to sort through the chaos of 
the infinite number of stimuli that can be perceived and create 
order where none exists so as to make the world intelligible.
Dependence on our mind's abstracted ordering thus leads 
both Hayek and Nietzsche to deny that we can know how things are 
in the world. We can only know how our mind orders our sensory 
experiences. In other words, both thinkers assert that we do not 
observe a translucent representation of the world ding an sich, 66 
rather, our minds impose an a priori pattern on it making it 
impossible to observe the supposed things that lurk behind 
appearances.
This intersection with Kant, however, should not be 
exaggerated. Although all three thinkers similarly recognize that 
objects of cognition are synthetic, Kant is alone in going no 
further. Hayek and Nietzsche, on the other hand, espouse a 
emergent theory of the mind. They not only argue that the objects 
of cognition are man-made, but that they are fluid in their 
character; i.e. they change. Hayek and Nietzsche thus distinguish 
themselves from Kant in their view that the phenomenal image our 
mind presents to us is in motion.
C . THE BECOMING OF THE MIND
Given our movements through time and space Hayek argues 
that the contents of our "sensory order" are not fixed data. The
65 Ibid., 42.
66 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason trans. N.K. 
Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), passim.
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things we know are but the result of the connecting activity of 
the mind as it orders experiences and is modified continuously by 
experience. Our "sensory order," in other words, evolves with 
each additional sensory experience; its contents and the 
relations between them are continually being updated with the 
introduction of each new bit of sensory information. Occasions 
arise, however, when our network of connections does not provide 
a ready binding point for a new experience. In this case, our 
"sensory order" is compelled to reorder so as to assimilate the 
new experience. Such an event "forces us to revise [our] 
classification[s]" to incorporate inconsistent experiences and 
make pragmatic adaptations to the world that we inhabit.67 Hayek 
conceives the human mind then like a sorting device that 
spontaneously reprograms to incorporate new experiences; it 
modifies itself so as to reclassify what would otherwise be 
meaningless information. Such reordering occurs whenever existing 
orders are disappointed by new experience. These inconsistencies 
are overcome when the experience that was formerly treated as a 
member of an unknown set is synthesized into a new set that 
encompasses both new and old events. Reordering is thus performed 
when regularities are reshuffled and a principle of connection is 
discovered that explains both new and old sensory experiences. 
Such a process is analogous to learning. Indeed, consider Robert 
deVries' linguist metaphor:68 Suppose that someone with little
Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 228.
deVries, "The Place of Hayek's Theory of Mind and 
Perception in the History of Philosophy and Psychology," 320-321.
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formal education, but lots of curiosity began to contemplate the 
linear order of sentences. This hypothetical person notices the 
following regularities:
John has called his sister.
Peter can buy a bicycle 
People won't die.
and
Has John called his sister?
Can Peter buy a bicycle?
Won't people die?
What does our aspiring linguist do? He sees the following
regularity: statements can be altered into questions by reversing
the order of the first two words of a sentence.
But then our would-be linguist encounters some new
experiences that falsify this pattern of regularities.
The big house is cheap.
People without lungs will die.
and
Is the big house cheap?
Will people without lungs die?
If his pattern of regularities were applied the above questions
would have the following syntactic form:
Big the house is cheap?
Without people lungs will die?
Since these questions are meaningless, our linguist's principles
of organization no longer account for his experience i.e. the
first and second words of a sentence are demonstrated not to be
the fundamental elements of the grammatical world. When this
realization occurs our linguist is compelled to reorder his
linguistic universe to behave pragmatically in his relations with
the external world. He may then notice a second patten of
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regularities, one that states that sentences can be changed into 
questions by reversing the order of the object and the finite 
verb. This second pattern would not only have explained his old 
experiences had he held it before, but it also explains his new 
experiences. Such a reordering of experiences is analogous to the 
process Hayek claims spontaneously transpires in the "sensory 
order" when old systems of connection are reconstituted.
This emphasis on the continual motion of the mind in light 
of new experience echoes Nietzsche's belief that the human mind 
is in a state of becoming. Indeed, Nietzsche is clear in his 
recognition that the human mind is an evolving phenomena. He 
explains:
The power of the mind to absorb foreign elements 
reveals itself in the strong tendency to make the new 
like the old. to simplify the manifold...its purpose 
is the incorporation of new "experiences," the adding 
of new material to old, its growth. . . Really, the mind 
is more like a stomach than anything else."69
Yet, unlike Hayek, Nietzsche is not explicit in his recognition
of cognitive reordering. What Nietzsche does say is that we seek
to "master the chaos one is, to compel one's chaos to become
form."70 What exactly this "mastering" entails is not made clear.
He does mention, however, that man "is that which must overcome
itself again and again."71 Whether or not this implies the
reordering of our sensory data to "incorporate new 'experiences'"
69 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil § 230. Emphasis in 
original.
70 Nietzsche, Will to Power, § 842.
71 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 138. Emphasis 
removed.
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is not stated. Nevertheless, Nietzsche does claim that the mind 
evolves. He explains: "We ourselves keep growing, keep changing, 
we shed our old bark, we shed our skins every spring...we are no 
longer free to do only one particular thing, to be only one 
particular thing."72
In any case, regarding the human mind both Hayek and 
Nietzsche see continual motion. They agree that our mind's view 
of the world is in a constant process of temporal change. Indeed, 
Hayek asserts, the phenomenal world we perceive is not constant, 
but "incessantly changing."73 Similarly, Nietzsche states that 
"all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts...but a 
continuous flux."74 In other words, both thinkers subscribe to 
the view that the contents of the human mind are in a discursive 
state of becoming. Of central importance to both theories of 
mind, however, is that this process is ultimately unknowable to 
the conscious self.
D . THE UNKNOWN SELF
Some thinkers, such as Karl Popper, acknowledge the 
existence of a 'submerged' portion of the mind, but they deny 
that this disturbs the unity and continuity of the self. They 
contend, rather, that the unconscious aspects of the mind can be
7 ?  •'*• Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 371. Emphasis in original.
73 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 234.
74 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Wanderer and His Shadow," 
Humanf All Too Human, § 11.
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"recalled" or accessed from the surface of consciousness.75 Hayek 
and Nietzsche are not convinced. Both thinkers maintain that 
everything that is "made conscious...belongs only to the surface, 
the skin which, like any skin reveals something but conceals even 
more!"76 Indeed, they contend that much of our cognitive activity 
is hidden beyond the scope of self-conscious introspection.
In order to understand what Hayek and Nietzsche mean when 
they claim that a portion of the self is hidden, we must begin 
with their shared belief that "that which becomes conscious is 
involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld from us."77 
According to both thinkers, there is a process which orders the 
contents of our consciousness, but which is beyond our self- 
awareness. We are, they argue, subject to the workings of an 
evolving cognitive framework which organizes our sensory 
experiences into our conscious mind and which is implicit in 
everything to which our mind refers, but which is nonetheless 
introspectively inaccessible to our conscious mind.
It is important to recognize the precise sense in which 
Hayek and Nietzsche maintain that a portion of the self is " entirely 
withheld" from us. A claim that we can know the cognitive processes 
which result in our conscious mind would mean that we could 
arrive at a substantive explanation of why we hold the views we 
do and how we know what we know. In such a case the conditions
75 Karl Popper, The Self and Its Brain. Part I ( New York: 
Springer-International, 1977), 129-131.
76 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. § 32. Emphasis added.
77 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. § 524. Emphasis added.
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would be favorable for deliberately directing our consciousness. 
We could on the basis of our conscious knowledge be able to
successfully direct our own mind’s activity. To make this 
conclusion, however, would entail positing the presence of a 
Cartesian self, of a free floating consciousness which is 
independent of the precursory workings of our becoming mind. 
Hayek and Nietzsche reject the possibility of such an autonomous 
engineer of consciousness, such a Cartesian self.
In Hayek's view, that which we call the conscious mind is 
generated from the micro-level interactions or connections of new 
and old sensory information. The mind which arises from this 
micro-level activity has its root therein, and it emerges
therefrom, but does not belong to it. It instead constitutes a 
new order of complexity which cannot describe in reverse its own 
construction. In other words, we can no more recursively describe 
how our conscious mind was arrived at than can tell from the 
number 5 that it was arrived at from 2 + 3 ,  7 - 2  or any other of
an infinite number of other calculations; this information
resides on a different level of complexity— one which governs the 
order of numbers or minds, but which is not demonstrable from the 
level of numbers or minds themselves. Based on this description 
of the mind, Hayek argues that there is a terra incognita of the self; 
the process which orders the contents of our conscious mind is 
beyond our self-conscious capacity to know. There is in other 
words, "on every level or in every universe of discourse, a part
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of our knowledge which although it is the result of experience, 
cannot be controlled by experience.”78
In this respect, our mind encounters some of the . same 
limitations as an "executive routine” of a computer program; i.e. 
consciousness arises from a process which arranges, simplifies, 
and schematizes the contents of our minds, but like an "executive 
routine" we do not have access to the process which oversees the 
ordering of this information. For an example, the "executive 
routines" of current chess-playing programs do not have access to 
the principle of play employed by the software, but only to the 
"summary judgment" of its "move evaluator." This "summary 
judgment" is a numerical quantity which represents the result of 
the program's application of its principle of play, yet this 
"summary judgment" conveys no information back to the "executive 
routine" regarding the process by which it was derived. An 
"executive routine" thus does not directly consider the principle 
upon which it functions.79 It instead operates on the basis of 
the results of its "summary judgment." Like a chess-playing 
program, the conscious mind is ordered by a process which cannot 
be accessed or self-consciously explicated. Indeed, Hayek 
contends that the mind is ordered by a process which we cannot 
consciously articulate— we only have access to the consequences 
of our "summary judgments." The mind, in short, is subject to a
7® Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 229.
79 Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on 
Mind and Psychology (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1981), 150-151.
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process which operates on the contents of consciousness but which 
cannot itself be consciously known.
It is important to realize, however, that this analogy is 
not fully appropriate. Unlike chess playing software the 
unconscious process Hayek speaks of does not consist of innate or 
Platonic ideas which are preprogrammed into human beings. 
Instead, he argues that the connective process is incidental. It 
simply refers to how the ongoing micro-level interactions of past 
and incoming sensory experiences spontaneously determine the 
overall order of the contents of our conscious mind.
Hayek warns us, moreover, that just because these micro­
level connective processes occur on an unconscious level that 
they should not be characterized as "sub-conscious." He puts this 
point clearly when he explains that "it is generally taken for 
granted that in some sense conscious experience constitutes the 
'highest' level in the hierarchy of mental events, and that what 
is not conscious has remained 'sub-conscious' because it has not 
yet risen to that level."80 Indeed, Hayek does not doubt that 
many mental processes through which stimuli evoke actions do not 
become conscious because they proceed on literally too low a 
level, "but this is no justification for assuming that all the 
[cognitive] events determining action to which no distinct 
conscious experience corresponds are in this sense sub­
80 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics. Economics 
and the History of Ideas. 45.
33
conscious.”81 Hayek goes on to claim that if his conception is 
correct that processes of
which we are not even aware determine the sensory 
qualities which we consciously experience, this would 
mean that of much that happens in our mind we are not 
aware, not because it proceeds at too low a level but 
because it proceeds at too high a level. It would 
seem more appropriate to call such a process not 
'sub-conscious; but 'super-conscious,' because they 
govern the conscious process without appearing in 
them. This would mean that what we consciously 
experience is only part, or the result, of processes 
of which we cannot be conscious, because it is only 
the multiple classification by the super-structure 
which assigns to a particular event that determined 
place in a comprehensive order which makes it a 
conscious event.82
The point Hayek makes here is that the order which emerges from
the complex interaction of past and present sensory experiences
"seems never to be the outcome of a conscious process, not
something at which we can deliberately aim, but always a
discovery of something which already guides its operation.”83 If
this connective activity were consciously accessible, we could
know the rules upon which our vary thoughts are based. But this,
Hayek argues, is impossible because we cannot self-consciously
calculate the activity to which all are conscious thoughts
necessarily refer. In other words, to direct our own
consciousness on a micro-level would "require that we should know
more than we actually do, which is, of course, a contradictory
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 46.
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statement.”84 More importantly, as a result of this limit to 
introspection, there can be no orchestrating or Cartesian self. 
We instead function on the results of our mind's non-conscious 
ordering activity. "Our mental activities are not guided by the 
particulars at which they are consciously directed, or of which 
the acting mind is aware, but by abstract rules which it cannot 
be said to know yet which nevertheless guide it."85
Like Hayek, Nietzsche contends that consciousness is simply 
a "shadow" of connective activity that is elsewhere delineated.86 
What we experience as consciousness is a symptom of our mind's 
ordering of our "thousandfold complexity."87 It is the outcome of 
"a multiplicity of subjects whose interaction and struggle is the 
basis of our thought and our consciousness."88 Under this view, 
everything that enters consciousness as a 'unity' is already 
tremendously complex. Hence, Nietzsche sees consciousness not as 
a beginning but as an end, the last link of a chain, the verdict 
of underlying micro-level activity.
Nietzsche sees consciousness then not as jg//-conscious, 
but as an awareness subordinate to an ordering and arranging self 
which is not conscious, i.e. it is not a "master" conscious, but
84 Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the 
Abuse of Reason. 86.
85 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics. Economics 
and the History of Ideas. 39.
88 Nietzsche, The Gay Science. § 179.
87 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 523.
88 Ibid., § 490.
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a "slave” conscious in relation to a "master" who is not 
conscious.89 Consciousness arises when a whole is subordinated to 
a superior whole. It is born in relation to micro-level cognitive 
activity of which consciousness is the result. Regarding our 
consciousness, concludes Nietzsche, "That a higher court rules 
over these things cannot be doubted."90
This view leads Nietzsche to address what is called the 
"actor—action" presumption.91 The "actor-action" presumption 
holds that actor A wills action B; i.e. actor A brings about action 
B. Such a distinction places the emphasis on the deliberate 
subject and implies that he/she has some meaningful discretion 
over action B. It implies that actor A has the ability to do 
otherwise and exercises an independence of action B.
For Nietzsche, the most important consequence of the 
"actor-action" presumption is its overestimation of the conscious 
self. Under the 'actor-action" presumption the subject is 
separated from his/her acts and given the status of a preeminent 
author. But in Nietzsche's view, consciousness is not 
qualitatively separable from the unconscious process which 
already arranges, simplifies, schematizes and interprets the 
contents of our consciousness. As a result, the unitary subject 
does not exist; the 'I' is merely a fiction attributed to the
8 9 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 39.
90 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 524.
91 Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of 
Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 
63-72.
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actor whose movements are based upon precursory cognitive 
activity. In this sense, actor and action are the products the 
same unconscious cognitive events. To say that actor A wills 
action B is then like saying the "lightening flashed;" it simply 
states two aspects of the same event and imposes a non-existent 
causal relationship between them. With regard to consciousness, 
Nietzsche concludes that there is no deliberate relationship 
between subject and action. We incorrectly believe "ourselves to 
be causal in the act of willing;" we incorrectly believe an 
action’s causes are "to be sought in consciousness;" and, above 
all, we incorrectly believe "that the ’I' causes the thought."92
In the end, Nietzsche, like Hayek, destabilizes the notion 
of the Cartesian self. Under his view, "thinking" does not 
necessarily imply the presence of a singularity, an "I" which 
"thinks." Instead, "thinking" is the by-product of an underlying 
multiplicity of cognitive interactions. The self is not a unity, 
it is "something com plicated, something that is a unity in word 
only."93 A unitary or Cartesian subject is thus not the prime 
mover or sovereign architect of human thought. Rather, thought is 
a by-product of elementary cognitive operations, operations which 
culminate in the form of the conscious self.
92 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, quoted in 
Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of 
Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 
70-71.
9  ^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 19. Emphasis in 
original.
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Nietzsche goes on to argue that our mind's elementary 
cognitive operations are beyond our capacity to know. Indeed, he 
claims that the mind's "great principle activity is 
unconscious”94 and that "by far the greatest part of our spirit's 
activity remains unconscious and unfelt."95 That these cognitive 
processes are inarticulate, however, is no excuse for dismissing 
them as inferior to conscious processes. For Nietzsche, it is an 
error to
regard the indistinct idea as a lower kind of idea 
than the distinct: but that which removes itself from 
our consciousness and for that reason becomes obscure 
can on that account be perfectly clear in itself. 
Becoming obscure is [only] a matter of perspective of 
consciousness.96
For Hayek and Nietzsche then, our behavior is not guided by 
a 'declarative' or 'deliberate' self. Rather it is mediated by a 
different system, one which operates above our conscious 
awareness. They argue that we do not have introspective access to 
these workings and interactions, but only to the consequences—  
such as the way we behave and feel. Thus thoughts are conscious 
products of a non-conscious process. It is crucial to remember 
that the subjective experience we call the consciousness is, 
therefore, not the primary business of the system which generates 
it, but shaped by intrespectively inaccessible process. 
Nietzsche, however, does not provide a explicit explanation as to 
why we cannot become self-aware of the connective process which
94 Nietzsche, The Gav Science. § 354.
95 Ibid., § 333.
96 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, § 528.
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culminates in our conscious mind— he simply states that it is the 
case. Hayek, on the other hand, goes further than Nietzsche 
regarding this subject and effectively surpasses Nietzsche's
theory of mind.
II. HAYEK'S IMPROVEMENT ON NIETZSCHE'S 
THEORY OF MIND
Hayek's belief that our connectionist mind is in perpetual 
motion leads him to certain important conclusions regarding the 
mind's operation which improve on Nietzsche's theory of mind. 
Foremost, Hayek recognizes three properties in the mind's 
operation— iteration, sensitivity to initial conditions and 
unpredictability— which offer an explanation as to why a portion 
of the self is "entirely withheld" from conscious awareness. 
These properties normally occur in what complexity theorists call 
"emergent" phenomena.97 An "emergent" phenomena is a natural 
phenomena, such an eco-system or weather pattern, in which 
evolving orders arise out of a complex array of interactive 
components. They are called "emergent" because they are moving 
through what physicists call "state space" where a "state point" is 
defined as the mathematical conception whose coordinates describe 
the state of a phenomena at a given point or snapshot in elapsing 
time.98 "State space," however, is not literal or physical space 
but something that can be understood by direct analogy.
97 Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), 9-14.
9® Steven H. Strogatz and Ian Stewart, "Coupled Oscillators 
and Biological Synchronization," Scientific American (December 
1993), 103.
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"State space" is a conceptual "space" which contains the 
various aspects or "dimensions" acting upon a phenomena. For 
example, consider your personal characteristics of age, height, 
weight, hair color, gender, income, level of education and 
occupation. Each of these characteristics corresponds to a one 
point on eight different charts, charts which contain the 
respective range of possible ages, heights, weights, etc. Now 
suppose the ranges of all eight charts could be represented 
simultaneously by a multidimensional space, and a single point 
within that space represents all eight aspects of your character 
at a particular moment in time. In this case, your character is 
reduced to a single "state point" in multidimensional space, yet 
this point still contains all the information that has been 
recorded about you. Consider further that as your characteristics 
change with time the point representing you appears to meander 
within this multidimensional space."
In a major respect, the concept of an "emergent" phenomena 
is compatible with Hayek1s notion of the "sensory order." Like an 
"emergent" phenomena, Hayek conceives of cognitive activity as 
neither on a continuum nor on a grid, but moving through a "state 
space" which contains all the dimensions and potential 
connections of our past, present and future sensory experiences. 
Moreover, the properties of iteration, sensitivity to initial 
conditions and unpredictability would account for our
99 J. Richard Eiser, Attitudes. Chaos and the Connectionist 
Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 225-229.
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connectionist mind's discursive movement through this "state 
space."
A. ITERATION
The first property Hayek identifies in functioning of our 
"sensory order” is iteration. Iteration is the successive process 
by which new information is integrated into present and future 
frameworks of an ongoing phenomena. In the case of the "sensory 
order" this process entails the "linking" of new sensory data 
into the present mental network. But when the "sensory order" 
incorporates a bit of sensory data it is itself is altered by 
that data; it recontextualizes. In other words our connectionist 
mind is like a mental encyclopedia which, at each successive 
moment publishes a revised edition into which the next relevant 
entry is inserted. As a result, each new sensory event one 
witnesses will be interpreted within the relative context of an 
updated network system of connections, one which incorporates the 
immediately preceding sensory information.
The "sensory order," consequently, is not a timeless 
phenomena. A timeless phenomena is a closed system such as a 
collection of musical notes where the possible patterns that can 
be played today are identical to the possible patterns that can 
be played next week, next year, next century. But what happens 
when the unity is broken and a new note is introduced? The whole 
nature of possible permutations is changed. No possible 
permutation of the former set of notes can replicate a sequence 
of the new sounds. The introduction of a new note, therefore, 
dramatically changes the possible outcome of all future melodies.
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Similarly, the introduction of each new bit of sensory 
information alters the "sensory order's" possible future 
scenarios. Indeed, the "sensory order" is perpetually changing. 
As one continues this process of weaving new information into the 
network, one's mind not only redefines relations between given 
sensory events and other events which are actually observed, but 
also between new and old events, and even conjectural relations 
between events. Added to this already dynamic picture is the 
process of mental reorganization. When reorganization occurs, 
says Hayek, the configurations of earlier orders are recombined 
into still more complex configurations. Each recontextualized 
order that then emerges contains within it the earlier orders, 
and the events of these orders acquire novel qualities which did 
not exist in them prior to their integration within the new 
order. As a consequence of such iteration each contemplation is 
unique or, as Heraclitus might put it, you cannot step into the 
same stream of thought twice. The structure of the connections in 
the mind, explains Hayek,
is modified by every new action exercised upon it by 
the external world, and since the stimuli acting on 
it do not operate by themselves but always in 
conjunction with the process called forth by the pre­
existing excitatory state, it is obvious that the 
response to a given combination of stimuli on two 
different occasions is not likely to be exactly the 
same. Because it is the whole history of the organism 
which will determine its action, new factors will 
contribute to this determination on the later 
occasion which were not present in the first. We 
shall find not only that the same set of external 
stimuli will not always produce the same responses, 
but also that altogether new responses will
100 Hayek; The Sensory Order. 123.
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B. SENSITIVITY TO INITIAL CONDITIONS
It is significant that Hayek notes that "there are several 
fields in which practical difficulties prevent us from thus 
elaborating known explanations of the principle to the point 
where they would enable us to predict particular events. This is 
often the case when phenomena are very complex, as in 
meteorology..."101 Indeed consider the case of MIT meteorologist 
Edward Lorenz. In 1960, Lorenz created a primitive weather 
simulator using twelve variables. Through the observance of 
dramatic fluctuations based on minute variations in initial 
values, Lorenz concluded that long range weather forecasting was 
doomed. No one listened, and by the 1980s millions of dollars and 
manhours had been spent in an attempt to program a Cray 
supercomputer to predict the weather. A network of measuring 
stations was established and the resulting half a million 
variables were inputted into the computer. The result was no 
better than using satellite photographs; "beyond two or three 
days the world's best forecasts were speculative, and beyond six 
or seven days they were worthless."102 But suppose that even more 
data could be inputted into the computer. "[S]uppose the Earth 
could be covered with sensors spaced one foot apart, rising at 
one foot intervals all the way to the top of the atmosphere. 
Suppose every sensor gives perfectly accurate readings of
-*•01 Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 243.
102 James Gleick, Chaos: The Making of a New Science (New 
York: Penguin, 1987), 20.
43
temperature, pressure, humidity and any other quantity a 
meteorologist would want...The computer will still not be able to 
predict whether Princeton, New Jersey will have sun or rain on a 
day one month away."103
The inherent impossibility of such long-range weather 
forecasting is the result of the fact that wether systems are 
extremely sensitive to initial conditions. That is to say, if the 
calculated temperature inputted into a wether forecasting 
computer is 75.0000*, but the actual temperature is 75.00001*, 
then this slight miscalculation in conjunction with others will 
evolve over time into prediction-wrecking size. Accordingly, the 
lighting of matches and the opening of refrigerator doors in 
Richmond today would have to be taken into account to accurately 
predict the weather in Williamsburg next month.
The human mind's sensitivity to initial conditions is no 
different in Hayek's view. Even a slight variation in the initial 
condition of your "sensory order" means that you are beginning 
from a different point than calculated. Subsequently, at each 
moment your understanding is evolving under different 
circumstances and each new experience carries you further from 
what you expected. Moreover, large collections of sensory 
experiences may exhibit seemingly random behavior. Like all 
complex systems the mind is extremely sensitive to minute 
influences. The sight of a familiar face, therefore can trigger 
an abrupt shift in the thought pattern and a corresponding shift
103 Ibid., 21.
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in one's awareness. For these reasons Hayek claims that we are in 
no better position to predict the specific future motions of the 
mind than we are "able to predict the shape and movement of [a] 
wave that will form on the [surface of the] ocean at a particular 
place and moment in time."104
The role of minute variables thus becomes important to 
Hayek1s view, especially regarding "'more highly organized' or 
essentially complex phenomena as we encounter in the realms of 
life, mind and society."105 There are, he notes, many examples in 
nature that elucidate the property of sensitivity to initial 
conditions. For example:
We can never produce a crystal or complex organic 
compound by placing the individual atoms in such a 
way that they will form a lattice of a crystal or the 
system of bezol rings which make up an organic 
compound....What does in these instances determine 
not only the general character of the crystal or 
compound that will be formed but also the particular 
position of any one element in them? The important 
point is that the regularity of conduct of the 
elements will determine the general character of the 
resulting order but not all the details of its 
particular manifestation. The particular manner in 
which the resulting abstract order will manifest 
itself will depend, in addition to the rules which 
govern the actions of its elements, on their initial 
position and on all the particular circumstances of 
the immediate environment to which each of them will 
react in the course of the formation of that order.
The order, in other words, will always be an 
adaptation to a large number of particular facts 
which will not be known in their totality to 
anyone...106
Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 243.
105 Friedrich Hayek, Law. Legislation and Liberty: A New 
Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political
Economy. Vol. I: Rules and Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1973), 41. Emphasis added.
106 Ibid., 39-40.
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Another example from physics is in some respects even more 
instructive of Hayek's view on the role of minute influences on 
complex phenomena.
In the familiar school experiment in which iron 
filings on a sheet of paper are made to arrange 
themselves along the lines of force of a magnet 
placed below, we can predict the general shape of the 
chains that will be formed by the filings hooking 
themselves together; but we cannot predict along 
which ones the family of an infinite number of such 
curves that define the magnetic field these chains 
will place themselves. This will depend on the
position, direction, weight, roughness or smoothness 
of each of the iron filings and on all the
irregularities of the surface of the paper. The 
forces emanating from the magnet and from each of the 
iron filings will thus interact with the environment 
to produce a unique instance of a general pattern, 
the general character of which will be determined by 
known laws, but the concrete appearance of which will 
depend on particular circumstances we cannot fully 
ascertain.107
In short, although the general pattern of growth and function of 
a complex system might be discovered and predicted, prediction of 
sub-patterns are precluded by the impossibility of accumulating 
all the information which contributes to its specific
manifestation.108
107 Ibid.
108 Because Hayek's account of the the properties of the 
"sensory order" resemble those we observe in physical phenomena 
we are brought to confront his position regarding physicalism. 
Physicalism is the view that objects of cognition are only the 
result of underlying material activities so that your joys and 
your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of 
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the the 
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules. Hayek subscribes to this physicalist view. He argues 
that the mind is simply the by-product of the interaction of 
brain material. The mind, he argues, "operates on the 
physiological events and arranges them into a structure or order 
that becomes the basis for their mental significance." Or, more 
explicitly, the mind's networking process is governed by 
"connections created in the nervous system by past linkages" and 
the ordering process is "determined by the system of connections 
by which impulses can be transmitted from neuron to neuron."
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C. UNPREDICTABILITY
Given the presence of iteration and sensitivity to initial 
conditions in the "sensory order" the question that inevitably 
arises for Hayek is whether one's "sensory order" can be 
predicted. The position he arrives at is that the number of
"Mind," in short says Hayek "is the order prevailing in a 
particular part of the physical universe—that part of it which we 
call ourselves."
This view is not entirely inconsistent with Nietzsche's 
philosophy. According to Leslie Paul Thiele, Nietzsche "reduced 
mental and spiritual activity to the status of physiological 
events." Indeed Nietzsche argued that moral and aesthetic 
judgments are merely the "'subtlest nuances' of the physis" and 
"My objections to the music of Wagner are physiological 
objections: why should I trouble to dress them up in aesthetic 
formulas? After all aesthetics is nothing but a kind of applied 
physiology." More importantly, however, Nietzsche is with Hayek 
in remaining skeptical as to the possibility of determining the 
origins of our physiological states. According to Nietzsche all 
conscious activity is suspected to have a specific physiological 
basis, but we may never know precisely "how deep and high the 
physis reaches."
Indeed, Hayek's physicalism, leads him to a conclusion that 
is the opposite of the one that normally follows from it; namely 
unpredictability. Hayek subscribes to what is called a token 
identity theory of the mind. The token identity theory holds that 
each psychological state corresponds to a physical state. While 
preserving a commitment to physicalism the token identity theory, 
however, does not insist that the same mental state in two 
separate individuals has the same physical identity—only that 
each mental state corresponds to a physical state. Hayek makes 
this qualification because he recognizes that which is remarkable 
about the human brain is not its universally present material, 
but the unique connections that emerge within this material. To 
put this notion another way consider what is called the idea of 
"grandma neurons." Suppose everybody's idea of "grandma" was 
universally determined by the same physical collection of neurons 
in everyone's brain. If those "grandma neurons" died in one 
person's brain not only could they not say "grandma," they could 
not think of her even if she were standing in front of them. 
Although neurons die and malfunction with regularity, nothing 
like this has ever been observed. The implication of this matter 
is that humans do not universally share the same physical state 
when they share the same mental state; i.e. there are not neurons 
in each person's head that correspond to the idea of "grandma." 
Instead, similar mental states have a different sort of physical 
manifestation; they arise from the historical connections that 
are woven into our individual brain material. The token identity 
theory of the mind thus allows Hayek to at once claim that the 
mind is a physical phenomenon, and yet not concede any sort of 
uniformity or predictability from mind to mind.
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variables— past, present and future— that would have to be taken 
into account are too numerous and detailed. It is impossible, he 
says, to accumulate and compute all the facts which contribute to 
the exact behavior of the "sensory order." Although we may know 
general knowledge of how a "sensory order" functions through the 
process of "linking," Hayek nevertheless asserts that we
will rarely if ever enable us to predict the precise 
result of any situation. While we can explain the 
principle on which certain phenomena are produced and 
can from this knowledge exclude the possibility of 
certain results, for example, of certain events 
occurring together, our knowledge will in a sense 
only be negative; that is, it will merely enable us 
to preclude certain results but not enable us to 
narrow the range of possibilities sufficiently so 
that only one remains.109
With this assertion Hayek distinguishes between "explanations in
principle" and "explanations in detail." The former are designed
to explain kinds of events or processes, the latter explain particular
events or processes.110 Indeed, "explanations in detail" refer to
the logical structure of the unique manifestation of an event or
process. Unlike an "explanation in principle," an "explanation in
detail" accounts for the properties of sensitivity to initial
conditions and iteration in a phenomena. Hayek argues, however,
that since we cannot account for these properties and are
accordingly inhibited from giving an "explanation in detail" of
our own mind's working. "If it should turn out," he says, "that
it is basically impossible to state or communicate all the rules
109 Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in 
the Abuse of Reason, 74.
110 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. Politics and Economics.
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which govern our actions...this would imply an inherent 
limitation of our possible knowledge and, in particular, the 
impossibility of ever fully explaining a mind of the complexity 
of our own.”111 Given the presence of iteration and sensitivity 
to initial conditions, Hayek argues that the number and detail of 
possible link patterns that would have to be taken into account 
to predict the cognitive activity of our own "sensory order" is 
greater than that which can be ascertained and effectively 
manipulated by our own mind. In other words, Hayek argues that 
there are far too many potential patterns of "links" or what he 
calls cognitive "constellations" to be effectively computed by 
one's own mind.
Hayek uses a calculator to elucidate this point that the 
number of "constellations" the "sensory order" can possibly 
become through additions and reorganizations is of a far greater 
magnitude than that same "sensory order" can compute: Suppose the 
highest value a calculator can display is 999,999,999. There are 
500,000,000 sums of two positive numbers which equal 999,999,999. 
Furthermore, there are 499,999,000 combinations of two positive 
numbers that equal 999,999,998; etc., etc. As a result, the total 
number of summation the calculator can perform is greater than 
the largest number it can display. To this number would have to 
be added all the combinations of three numbers, four numbers, 
etc. Ultimately the total number of distinct combinations the
111 Hayek; quoted in Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 2d ed., 22.
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calculator can perform far exceed the calculator's display 
capacity.112
Applying this same principle to the human mind, Hayek 
concludes that although "linking" or connecting sensory events 
provides an explanation of the general principle on which our 
"sensory order" operates, we shall never, by means of the same 
brain be able to arrive at a detailed explanation of its working 
in particular circumstances, or be able to predict what the 
results of an operation will be. To achieve this would require a 
higher order of complexity because, in addition to showing how 
any one sensory experience will behave in a particular situation, 
we would also have to be capable of showing how any one of these 
sensory events would behave in any one of a large number of other 
situations. Prediction, in othe words, is based on the impossible 
capacity to self-consciously know the behavior, over time, of 
each sensory event under varying future conditions. Like Hayek's 
calculator, the sheer number of possible future scenarios exceeds 
our conscious computational capacity. Although the principle upon 
which the function and pattern of growth of our complex "sensory 
order" may be appreciated, the impossibility of knowing all the 
facts which contribute to its specific features precludes 
predictions in particular cases. Consequently, we cannot 
introspectively access our own mind's operation. The properties 
of Hayek's connectionist theory of mind thus leads him to the 
conclusion that there is no overseeing or Cartesian self who
H 2  Hayek, "Philosophical Consequences," 246-247.
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directs our cognitive activity in a conscious manner. Instead, 
there is a terra incognita^ an unknown territory of the self. This 
conclusion however, is not without profound implications for both 
political and economic theory, implications which Hayek
explicitly recognizes.
III. HOW HAYEK’S IMPROVEMENT INFORMS 
BOTH HIS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORIES
As we have seen, Hayek improves on the Nietzschean theory 
of mind and demonstrates that the unified subject, far from being 
a self-certain foundation, is a fiction, a historically 
contingent construct beneath whose apparent unity teams a welter 
of non-conscious cognitive activity. It is out of this material, 
says Hayek, that all societies and economies arise and change. 
They result from the complex interaction of preferences and 
motivations as they manifest in millions of seething "sensory 
orders." Societies and economies, in other words, are the 
composites of supporting and counteracting actions and reactions 
of individual "sensory orders," amalgams of multiple relations in
motion. Accordingly, all sociological phenomena, from local
economies to international wars, are the by-products of the 
interplay of motivations of individual human beings. Customs, 
laws, culture, etc. are a part of the natural history of
civilization; they emerge directly from the composite of 
individuals' dealings with each other, they coeval with the 
emergence of society. The views people form of each other and 
things thus forms the basis of the social structure.
Consequently, when we speak of a particular society or economy,
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we are not talking about a unitary thing. Instead, says Hayek, it 
is just a short-hand way of referring to an interactive 
collection of people's motivations, opinions, preferences and 
ideas, and to speak of it as if it were a unitary whole obscures 
all these complex relationships which contribute to the overall 
pattern of activity that results in a society or economy.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR HAYEK1S POLITICAL THEORY
Hayek's view that the evaluations and opinions of 
individuals trigger the social sphere contrasts sharply with the 
view that societies are the products of human reason. Indeed, 
Hayek claims that the orderly structures we find in society "are 
the product of the actions of many men, but are not the result of 
human design."113 Order, he explains, arises "spontaneously" 
through the complex interplay of millions of "sensory orders." It 
is an order which evolves in a gradual and decentralized process, 
which constitutes an unintended effect of the motivations and 
actions of many interacting individuals and not human design.
Hayek claims that his notion of "spontaneous order" is 
descriptive and value free. The notion of the "spontaneous 
order," he says, simply functions as an explanatory framework for 
the complex phenomena we call society; it describes the evolution 
of societies without teleological or purposive pretensions. Hayek 
does recognize that the original meaning of the term evolution 
refers to a manifestation of potentialities already contained in 
the germ. His theory of social evolution, however, does not imply
113 Hayek, Law. Legislation and Liberty, 36-37.
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such a succession of specific steps. Hayek disagrees with those like 
Karl Marx and August Comte, who assert that "evolution implies a 
necessary sequence of predetermined stages or phases through 
which the development of an organism or institution must 
pass."114 Instead, Hayek's notion of society is 'blind,' i.e. 
change is not teleological, societies simply fulfil and consume 
themselves in a discursive fashion.
Since his theory of "spontaneous order" has no normative 
content Hayek's concept of the "sensory order" does not lead, at 
a foundational level, to any commitment to inviolable individual 
rights. Instead, Hayek claims that all values and 'rights' are 
the products of and not antecedent to the "spontaneous order." 
These "particular aspects of culture," he explains, "can be 
critically examined only within the context of that 
culture... [and] we must stop with our criticism of something that 
has no better grounds for existence than that it is the accepted 
basis of the particular tradition”115 Furthermore, these 
spontaneously created values are not static:
It is a fact which we must recognize that even what 
we regard as good or beautiful is changeable— if not 
in any recognizable manner that would entitle us to 
take a relativistic position, then in a sense that in 
many respects we do not know what will appear as the 
good or beautiful to another generation... It is not 
only his knowledge, but also his aims and values that 
man is a creature of his civilization; in the last 
resort, it is the relevance of these individual 
wishes to the perpetuation of the group or the 
species that will determine whether they persist or 
change. It is, of course, a mistake to believe that
114 Ibid., 24.
115 Ibid., 25.
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we can draw conclusions about what our values ought
to be simply because we realize that they are the
product of evolutions.116
Hayek seems here to make a Weberian point. Like Max Weber, Hayek 
asserts that our values, "even our highest, our ultimate” values 
are historically "mutable and transitory."117 Indeed, like Weber, 
Hayek claims that "value-judgements are made everywhere in 
a ... spontaneous manner"— they are the by-product of the 
discursive interplay of historical forces118— and the Weberian 
"mass psychological character"119 that emerges from this 
interplay is what Hayek calls society.
Inasmuch as nothing in the detailed content of our moral 
conventions is unchanging or unalterable, Hayek goes on to 
contend that we are compelled to abandon the whole notion that 
values have a character or universality or fixity. "There is 
thus," remarks Hayek, "one possible sense in which we may 
legitimately regard human values as relative and speak of the 
probability of their further evolution."120 It furthermore raises 
serious questions about the status of an innate "human nature." 
Indeed, Hayek claims that:
The important point is that every man growing up in a
given culture will find in himself rules, or he may
116 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 35-36.
117 Wilhelm Hennis, Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 146-162.
118 Ibid.
it>id.
120 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
28.
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discover that he acts in accordance with rules— and 
will similarly recognize the actions of others as 
conforming or not conforming to various rules. This 
is, of course, not proof that they are a permanent or 
unalterable part of 'human nature,' or that they are 
innate, but proof only that they are part of a 
cultural heritage...121
With this assertion Hayek joins Nietzsche in his voyage 
beyond good and evil. Indeed, like Nietzsche, Hayek contends that 
morality is a social creation which has no static or objective 
basis. The implicit "realism" of ordinary moral language is 
overestimated. The fact that a particular norm has evolved does 
not guarantee that it is optimal, nor that it will continue to 
function in the future. "Our present values," explains Hayek,
exist only as elements of a particular cultural 
[historical] tradition and are significant only for 
some more or less long phase of evolution— whether 
this phase includes some of our pre-human ancestors 
or is confined to certain periods of human 
civilization. We have no more grounds to ascribe to 
them eternal existence than the human race.122
Similarly, Nietzsche claims that our values are not true all the
way through; they are not transhistorical or timeless realities.
Nietzsche explains:
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and 
glittering in the innumerable solar systems, there 
was once a star on which clever animals invented 
ethics. That was the haughtiest and most mendacious 
minute of world history— yet only one minute. After 
nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold and 
the clever animals had to die.123
In this sense, when someone claims that a social structure is
"socially unjust," the universe yawns and takes another breath.
121 Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty. 19.
122 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
38.
123 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 42.
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It is therefore Hayek's opinion that it is fraudulent to use the 
words "social injustice" when what one is really talking about is 
preferences, i.e. what social arrangement one endorses. For this 
reason "social injustice" has no meaning for Hayek and he reports 
that "to discover the meaning of what is called 'social justice' 
has been one of my chief preoccupations for more than ten years.
I have failed in this endeavor or rather, have reached the 
conclusion that...the phrase has no meaning whatever."124
Despite his emphasis on the individual, Hayek acknowledges 
the feedback relationship between society and the self. Indeed, 
he believes that any political theory must not only take into 
account the individual, but an individuals' interaction with 
their environment including the community of people around them. 
Any description of the individual must therefore be supplemented 
by a social theory.
Regarding social theory, Hayek contends that social objects 
emerge when a multitude of individuals converge upon a single 
system of rules to create social objects such as language, law, 
and markets. This convergence, furthermore, is essential to the 
formation of such social objects. For example, no single person 
can create new words and meanings: language must always be
shared. To make sense, individual words must belong to a pre­
existing common storehouse of language. As a means of elucidating 
this account of public meaning Neville Wakefield's chess analogy is 
illuminating: From the point of view of someone new to chess it
124 Hayek, New_Studies in Philosophy. Politics. Economics 
and the History of Ideas. 57.
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might seem logical that one should study chess in terms of all 
the moves in all the games that have ever been played. But this 
approach would fail to account for the fact that each individual 
move is selected as an option from a much larger range of 
possible moves, and that no single move is significant, except in 
relation to what preceded it and of course to the projected 
strategy of one's opponent. To study chess properly, therefore, 
one must look to a system of principles for making and 
anticipating the moves— a system which underlies every move at 
every point in the game. Only when a player converges onto his 
opponents structure and internalizes it in terms of its overall 
coherence rather than its individual parts does the game become 
meaningful.125
According to Hayek, a similar convergence upon an 
"internalized structure" is necessary in the creation of social 
objects such as language, morals, etc. Hayek calls these 
"internalized structures" "social rules;" rules which govern 
shared meanings and social practices. Hayek explains:
We are able to understand one another and get along 
with one another, are able to act successfully on 
plans because most of the time members of our 
civilization conform to unconscious patterns of 
conduct, show regularity in their action that is not 
the result...of any conscious adherence to known 
rules, but of firmly established habits and 
traditions. The general observance of these 
conventions is a necessary condition of the 
orderliness of the world in which we live, of our 
being able to find our way through it though we do
125 Neville Wakefield, Postmodernism: Twilight of the Real 
(London: Pluto Press, 1990), 73.
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not know their significance and may not even be 
consciously aware of their existence.126
And even more explicitly: "We have seen that our capacity to
recognize actions as following rules and having meaning rests on
ourselves being already equipped with these rules. This knowledge
by acquaintance presupposes therefore that some of the rules in
terms of which we perceive and act are the same as those by which
the conduct of those actions we interpret is guided."127 This is
definitively a Burkean point. Indeed, according to Edmund Burke
we are subject to "prejudices" or "habits" that condition our
behavior. As Burke writes,
I am bold enough to confess that we are men of 
untaught feelings, that instead of casting them away 
all our old prejudices, we cherish them...Prejudice 
is ready application in the emergency; it previously 
engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and
virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the
moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and
unresolved. Prejudice renders man's virtue his 
habit, and not a series of unconnected acts.128
Hayek does appreciate the important role "social rules"
play in a society. According to his writings, the efficacious
operation of a society depends for its existence on a cultural
matrix of historical practices which shape and permeate the moral
and intellectual capacities of the individual. Society, for
Hayek, hinges upon individuals who are not natural datum but
rather historical achievements. "The rules we are discussing," he
writes, "are those that are not so much useful to the individuals
126 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 66.
127 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
59.
128 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), 76-77.
58
who observe them, as those that (if they are generally observed) 
make all the members of the group more effective, because they 
give opportunities to act within a social order,"129 As an example 
of what Hayek means by ’’opportunities," consider the following 
example: Suppose that long ago any human encountering another
would either try to kill him or run away. This sort of behavior 
would certainly not have led to the formation of ordered groups. 
When, however, some humans somewhere chose to cease fighting or 
fleeing they were ’liberated,' they found that they were better 
able to pursue other ends.130 Through this historical experience 
they gained wisdom. They learned that not fighting or fleeing 
made for a different social opportunities. Hayek's insight here 
is that "social rules" may thus be profitably viewed as vehicles 
of information; they contain the accumulated experiences of many
129 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy. Politics, Economics 
and the History of Ideas, 7. Emphasis in Original.
130 This view stands in sharp contrast to Nietzsche's. 
Nietzsche does not find the cultural matrix of historical 
practices or "social rules" to have any 'liberating' content. He 
instead finds them oppressive. He contends that social 
conventions are not self-evident truths, but products of 
inheritance, things that are historically beaten into people. All 
social conventions are the result of this process which 
culminates in the colonization of people'sscope of view and the 
internalization of conformity. A convention, therefore, is simply 
the product of historical conquest, the product of "fossilized 
violence." Moreover, Nietzsche maintains that humans are born 
into these already constructed matrices of social conventions or 
"strait-jackets" of "custom" that are historically embedded in 
our understanding. As a result, how we behave is determined by a 
historical "archive" of understanding. Our behavior, 
consequently, is not the product of free thought, but confined by 
the parameters of an historical inventory. Accordingly, Nietzsche 
criticizes "social rules" as disciplinary devices. Indeed, he 
claims that social behavior derived from a "social rule" is not 
neutral, it is but an inculcated expression of an historical 
force.
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generations and provide us with the ability to see through 
different social opportunities.
Despite the fact that Hayek has no doubt that it is 
possible to gain societal opportunities through the use of 
"social rules," he is emphatic in his belief that arresting these 
rules is dangerous. By ossifying our "social rules" we ignore the 
fact that society is spontaneously emerging. To not recognize 
this movement and force "social rules" prostrate on a society 
like a rigid and inflexible grid only invites disaster. Indeed, 
when we impose a preconceived pattern on society we inhibit our 
ability to adapt to the necessities of future circumstances and 
says Hayek, "we should not be surprised if society, as such, 
ceases to function as a creative force."131 Such a concern for 
adaptability, furthermore, is implicit in Hayek's critique of 
democratic statesmen. According to Hayek:
The successful politician owes his power to the fact 
that he moves within the accepted framework of 
thought, that he thinks and talks conventionally. It 
would be almost a contradiction in terms for a 
politician to be a leader in the field of ideas. His 
task in a democracy is to find out what the opinions 
held by the largest number are, not to give currency 
to new opinions which may become the majority view in 
some distant future.132
Hayek's recognition of the socializing effect of society on 
the self, however, is qualified. He contends that the "social 
rules" that contribute to the shaping of the behavior of 
individuals are not immutable. As a result, social change is
131 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics 
and the History of Ideas, 20.
132 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 112.
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implicit in Hayek*s philosophy. Indeed, he announces that "the 
conservatives among you, who up to this point may be rejoicing, 
will now probably be disappointed. The proper conclusion from the 
considerations I have advanced is by no means that we may 
confidently accept all the old traditional 'values'" or "social 
rules."133 Nor, claims Hayek, even that there are any "social 
rules" or moral principles that are beyond question. Instead, he 
argues that contained within a society is the proformative 
capacity to initiate change, to innovate— but not because people 
are outside their cultural context, but because their actions are 
uncferdetermined by that context; individual human beings are not 
passive robots programmed to follow the conventions of larger 
society, instead they are capable of resistance within the 
context of that society. Each connectionist mind, each "sensory 
order,” he explains, comprises a unique pattern and out of this 
uniqueness arises a natural diversity which is not wholly 
determined by the social structure. Consequently, Hayek would 
reject Marxian claim that it is exclusively a person's "social 
existence that determines his consciousness."134
As a result of this natural diversity, societies are far 
more ill-behaved and elusive than political theorist formerly 
imagined. Hayek contends that society is not rendered from the
133 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics 
and the History of Ideas, 19.
134 Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy; quoted in Karl Popper, "The Autonomy of 
Sociology," Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays ed. J.B. 
Schneewind (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1968), 426.
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sort of distinct causes and effects that might be written in 
Newton's own handwriting. Instead, he claims that society is a 
centerless phenomenon with constantly shifting borders. He 
maintains that a society has no essence, no inherent character, 
no teloSf it is simply the given or "spontaneous" configuration of 
historical forces at a given moment in elapsing time. Society is, 
as Foucault puts it, "nothing other than the instant photograph 
of multiple struggles continuously in transformation."135
In this sense Hayek concludes that no society is permanent. No 
single historical episode, no single historical network of 
arrangements is inherently static; in all historical episodes and 
arrangements there is always tension and struggle, both actual 
and potential, movement is going on at all times in everything—  
customs, laws, languages, morals, arts, etc. As he points out, 
prevailing moral systems "do not always give unambiguous answers 
to the questions which arise, but often prove internally 
contradictory."136 As a result, "we are forced to develop and 
refine our moral systems continuously.”137 Ultimately, the conclusion 
that flows from Hayek's theory of mind is not that society is a 
rigid form, but that it is a shifting and unsteady mass comprised
1.35 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live ed. Sylb6re Lot ringer 
(New York: Semiotext, 1989), 183; quoted in Leslie Paul Thiele, 
"The Agony of Politics: The Nietzschean Roots of Foucault's 
Thought," American Political Science Review (September 19 90), 
921.
136 Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy. Politics. Economics
and the History of Ideas, 20.
I37 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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of a multitude of decentralized interactions among many emerging 
"sensory orders."
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR HAYEK'S ECONOMIC THEORY
In order to understand how Hayek's improved theory of mind 
informs his economic theory we must understand what he calls the 
"knowledge problem.”138 The "knowledge problem" arises because 
social behavior is not based on 'objective' decisions, but upon 
the subjective motions of individual's "sensory orders," where 
the key variables are their manifestations in the particular 
motivations of individuals. Because human action does not exist 
separate from the emerging cognitive template or "sensory order" 
of each individual a scientific examination of human action will 
fail. Human action, in other words, does not have an objective 
ontological status; there is no Archimedean point from which to 
describe it. It is contingent rather upon what we 'think' about 
other people and things.
To make the point clearer that the state of mind of the 
individuals is what is important to human behavior, consider an 
example put forth by Joel Schwartz: "When I roast a leg of a lamb 
over a fire until it is a charred pile of ashes, I may be 
conducting a unsuccessful barbecue, but when Odysseus does the 
same thing he may be conducting a successful sacrifice. Indeed 
Odysseus is not 'roasting' at all since 'roasting' only has 
meaning internal to the activity of food preparation. Nor are we 
in fact 'doing the same thing,' although behavioral descriptions
138 Friedrich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," The 
American Economic Review (September 1945), passim.
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or pictures of the movements of our bodies may be identical."139 
An illustration is taken from Hayek to demonstrate this same 
point that the subjective motivations of individuals, and not 
’objective facts,' are what is relevant to social behavior: Our 
belief that a magic charm does not work is irrelevant to the 
social significance of the charm. It is irrelevant to our 
comprehension of the actions of the individuals who believe in 
the charm.140 In his book on Hayek G. R. Steele puts this point
more directly:
Human action is never centered upon objective facts.
For example, a barometer is capable of 
giving...information about the physical world; but a 
barometer becomes changed as a fact once the purpose 
for which it can be used is known; and this 
information is an abstraction from the physical 
attributes of the barometer, which might serve as a 
paddle, a weapon, or as an instrument to gage air- 
pressure. In other words, the facts of the social 
sciences are the opinions held by the people whose 
actions are studied.141
As a result of this subjectivity, says Hayek, it is 
impossible to accurately plan an economy without accounting for 
peoples' emerging "sensory orders." Indeed, because all their 
perceptions, judgments and attitudes arise from a subjective 
cognitive framework, people may react to the same stimuli in 
different ways, and to different stimuli in the same way. 
Accordingly, to accurately plan an economy the planner would have
-^39 Joel D. Schwartz, "Participation and Multisubjective 
Understanding: An Interpretivist Approach to the Study of 
Political Participation," Journal of Politics (Vol. 46, 1984), 
1119.
140 G.R. Steele, The Economics of Friedrich Hayek (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 79.
141 Ibid. 80.
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to acquire all of the "knowledge" of how these "sensory orders" 
operate and why human beings act a certain way under certain 
circumstances. An accurate explanation of any social phenomena 
must therefore take into the mind-sets of the people who comprise 
a society. It must take into account how we acquire knowledge to 
solve our encountered problems. Hence, a theory of human action 
can succeed only if it accounts for the cognitive operations of 
human beings and provides an explanation of how knowledge is 
acquired to solve problems.
As was discussed earlier, however, Hayek demonstrates that 
"we are unknown to ourselves, " that we cannot know our own 
cognitive workings. If his demonstration is valid, then the 
economic planner faces a fundamental obstacle in the positivist 
study of human affairs. Put more precisely, without the direct 
apprehension of people's cognitive operations, economic planners 
are effectively denied the access to quantifiable causal 
imputations of each "sensory order" and hence economic phenomena. 
Indeed, the economic planner can never decipher or distangle the 
connective process of their human subject matter and discover the 
'causes' of an economy. As David Hubei puts it, "there is an 
input: Man's only way of knowing the outside world. There is an 
output: man's only way of responding to the outside world...[a]nd 
between input and output there is everything e lse . . .memories, 
thought, and whatever else makes man human."142 According to 
Hayek, this "everything else" is not knowable. The patterns of
142 David Hubei, "The Brain," Scientific American 
(September 1979), 32. Emphasis added.
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the "sensory order," he says, comprise an intricate tensional 
network of cross-points and junctions that support and counteract 
each other. Where these crosscurrents are interwoven, the 
emergent cognitive landscape is terra incognita to even the most 
inquisitive economic planner.
The broad implication of this view is that economies cannot 
be centrally planned. Since the basic source of human behavior—  
the human mind— eludes thorough introspection, economic planning 
based on social scientific explanations are doomed to err. It is 
a fatal conceit, he contends, to believe that the technical 
knowledge necessary to plan an economy is accessible to the 
central planner. At best, a central planner can acquire limited 
knowledge about their human subject matter, knowledge that, by 
the time it is compiled and analyzed, is no longer 
contemporaneous. Moreover, a planner cannot possibly collect 
thorough data or "knowledge" on each of the millions of "sensory 
orders" that are underlay an economy. People's motives are only 
known only to themselves and not understood properly even by 
them. The idea that the relevant information to efficiently plan 
an economy can be concentrated in the calculations of a central 
planning board is thus absurd.
The central planner cannot possibly calculate all the 
supplies and demands that will manifest via the comprehensive 
interaction of millions of subjective "sensory orders." As a 
result, a planned economy has no means of accurately 
communicating to consumers and producers the actual supplies and 
demands that will emerge at a given point in time. The only way
to consistently and accurately determine this, and make full use 
of all the decentralized information contained in our "sensory 
orders,” is through the forum of the market. Only out of the 
interaction of all the "sensory orders” in a market can "prices" 
spontaneously arise to communicate to consumers and producers the 
supplies and demands of goods at a given point in time. Moreover, 
as supplies and demands change this information can be fluidly 
communicated through price changes. In the end, central planners 
do not have a means like the spontaneous "price" to reflect right 
quickly the actual supplies and demands in an economy.
Ultimately, says Hayek, unlike the market, central planners 
do not utilize all of the dispersed "knowledge" or information 
embodied in our "sensory orders." Central planners instead 
compress individuals into formulae. Consequently, they use less 
information than concretely contributes to the motion of an 
economy; they assume the "knowledge problem" away and, says 
Hayek, "disregard everything that is important and significant in 
the real world."143 They remove the economic world from its given 
imperfection and unconformability and impose imaginary boundaries 
on the fluid media of individuals that is the economy. Central 
planners thus do not deal with reality. They move from any 
imaginable economic world to an abstract fantasy in which humans 
are abolished and all that remains are featureless and 
ahistorical monads. Indeed, to paraphrase Roland Barthes, in
Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," 530.
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attempting to capture economic life the planner actually sees 
dead.144
CONCLUSION
To recap, we have seen that Hayek maintains Nietzsche's 
claim that "we are unknown to ourselves," and that he does so by 
improving on Nietzsche's connectionist theory of mind. We have 
seen also that Hayek demonstrates that our emergent mind is 
subject to the properties of iteration, sensitivity to initial 
conditions and unpredictability, properties which forbid self- 
knowledge of the cognitive processes which culminate in our 
conscious mind. Based on this terra incognita of the self Hayek 
rejects analyses of societies and economies which force the 
unique and complex entities that are humans beings into unbending 
and inactual explanatory grids. Instead, Hayek's theory of the 
"sensory order" forces him to confront life as it is given; it 
restores life to its original difficulty by affirming its motion 
and intricacy.Q
144 Wakefield, Postmodernism: The Twilight of the Real, 3.
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